The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector

David Martimort, Marc Ivaldi and Philippe Gagnepain

No 8042, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural principal-agent model with renegotiation on a set of urban transport service contracts. The model captures two important features of the industry. First, only two types of contracts are used in practice (fixed-price and cost-plus). Second, subsidies increase over time. We compare a scenario with renegotiation and a hypothetical situation with full commitment. We conclude that the welfare gains from improving commitment would be significant but would accrue mostly to operators.

Keywords: Contract; Public transit; Renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector (2013)
Working Paper: The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector (2013)
Working Paper: The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector (2013)
Working Paper: The cost of contract renegotiation: Evidence from the local public sector (2013)
Working Paper: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector (2010)
Working Paper: The Cost of Contract Renegotiation: Evidence from the Local Public Sector (2010)
Working Paper: The Cost of contract renegotiation: evidence from the local public sector (2009)
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