Contract Choice, Incentives, and Political Capture in the Public Sector

Marc Ivaldi and Philippe Gagnepain

No 8053, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory schemes are the observable items of a complex menu of contracts, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We suggest that the generation process of the data we have in hand is better explained by a regulatory framework where an unsophisticated regulator is politically motivated. We show how these political preferences shape the contract choice and we shed light on how operating costs are affected. On average, operators? costs are 12.1% lower under fixed-plus regimes, compared to the cost-plus cases.

Keywords: Contract choice; Cost reduction; Incentives; Public transit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C51 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8053 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8053

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8053

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().