Competition Between Multiple Asymmetric Networks: Theory and Applications

Steffen Hoernig

No 8060, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We present a tractable model of competition between an arbitrary number of interconnected communications networks in the presence of tariff-mediated network externalities, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. On the theory side, we provide a criterion for stability in expectations and determine equilibrium outcomes in linear and two-part tariffs. As applications, we reconsider mobile termination for calls from the fixed network (FTM), and between mobile networks (MTM). We show that there is a partial FTM waterbed effect under linear tariffs, and that with more than two networks some known duopoly results are reversed: Under multi-part tariffs, consumer surplus may decrease (rather than increase), and under linear tariffs both on- and off-net prices may increase with higher MTM termination charges.

Keywords: Call externality; Mobile termination rates; Multiple networks; On/off-net pricing; Telecommunications network competition; Waterbed effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications (2014)
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