Provision of Public Inputs and the Effects of Successful Lobbying in Open Economies

Michael Rauscher ()

No 807, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Lobbying activities bias the political decision-making process. There tend to be deviations from the socially-optimal solutions. This paper shows that in an international context, this bias is not necessarily harmful in terms of economic welfare. It may correct externalities that occur in an international policy game when individual governments behave strategically. The strategic variable in this model is the quantity of a factor of production which is provided by the government, e.g. an infrastructure good. If both countries under consideration are large and wish to affect the remuneration of the internationally mobile factor of production, it can be seen that one country provides too much of the public input whereas the other country does not provide enough. Lobbying activities that tend to increase the supply of this input in the latter country may, therefore, lead to welfare gains for both countries involved in the jurisdictional competition, provided that the source cost of lobbying is not to high.

Keywords: International Capital Movements; Lobbies; Public Provision of Inputs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F21 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1993-07
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