Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service
Martin Gaynor (),
Rodrigo Moreno-Serra () and
No 8203, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
The effect of competition on the quality of health care remains a contested issue. Most empirical estimates rely on inference from non experimental data. In contrast, this paper exploits a pro-competitive policy reform to provide estimates of the impact of competition on hospital outcomes. The English government introduced a policy in 2006 to promote competition between hospitals. Patients were given choice of location for hospital care and provided information on the quality and timeliness of care. Prices, previously negotiated between buyer and seller, were set centrally under a DRG type system. Using this policy to implement a difference-in-differences research design we estimate the impact of the introduction of competition on not only clinical outcomes but also productivity and expenditure. Our data set is large, containing information on approximately 68,000 discharges per year per hospital from 160 hospitals. We find that the effect of competition is to save lives without raising costs. Patients discharged from hospitals located in markets where competition was more feasible were less likely to die, had shorter length of stay and were treated at the same cost.
Keywords: competition; hospitals; quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at email@example.com
Journal Article: Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition, and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service (2013)
Working Paper: Death by Market Power. Reform, Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service (2010)
Working Paper: Death by Market Power: Reform, Competition and Patient Outcomes in the National Health Service (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8203
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=8203
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().