The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets
Gregory Crawford and
Ali Yurukoglu
No 8370, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
We measure how the bundling of television channels affects welfare. We estimate an industry model of viewership, demand, pricing, bundling, and input market bargaining using data on ratings, purchases, prices, bundles, and input costs. We conduct simulations of à la carte policies that require distributors to offer individual channels for sale to consumers. We estimate that negotiated input costs rise by 103.0 percent under à la carte. These higher input costs offset consumer benefits from purchasing individual channels. Mean consumer and total surplus change by an estimated -5.4 to 0.2 percent and -1.7 to 6.0 percent, respectively.
Keywords: A la carte; Bargaining; Bundling; Cable; Counterfactual; Econometrics; Multichannel; Nash product; Pay; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 C72 L50 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)
Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8370 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
Related works:
Journal Article: The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets (2012) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8370
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8370
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().