Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation

Steffen Hoernig

No 8399, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Due to technological convergence, multiple infrastructures can now offer broadband or triple-play services, while the existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run if regulatory constraints provide strong first-mover advantages to the unregulated network.

Keywords: Access regulation; Cable; Convergence; Copper (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8399 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8399

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8399

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().