Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy -Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History

Uwe Sunde and Florian Jung

No 8406, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The results imply that for any level of development there exists a distribution of resources such that democracy emerges in equilibrium, but there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium irrespective of the level of development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy with regard to changes in the economic and demographic environment. The results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after 1871.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Democracy; Development; Income inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H10 O10 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-his and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy – Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History (2011)
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