EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Capital Regulation and Tail Risk

Enrico Perotti (), Lev Ratnovski () and Razvan Vlahu ()

No 8526, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: The paper studies risk mitigation associated with capital regulation, in a context where banks may choose tail risk assets. We show that this undermines the traditional result that higher capital reduces excess risk-taking driven by limited liability. Moreover, higher capital may have an unintended e¤ect of enabling banks to take more tail risk without the fear of breaching the minimal capital ratio in nontail risky project realizations. The results are consistent with stylized facts about pre-crisis bank behavior, and suggest implications for the optimal design of capital regulation.

Keywords: Capital regulation; Keywords: Banking; Risk; Risk-taking; Systemic risk; Tail risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-rmg and nep-upt
Date: 2011-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=8526 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011) Downloads
Working Paper: Capital Regulation and Tail Risk (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8526

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=8526

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2019-12-13
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8526