Professional Network and Career Coevolution

Paul Seabright and Nicoletta Berardi

No 8632, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper examines how networks of professional contacts contribute to the development of the careers of executives of European and US companies. We build a dynamic model of career progression in which career moves both depend upon existing networks and contribute to the development of future networks. We test the theory on an original dataset of nearly 7000 executives in over 3000 firms. We find evidence that professional networks are relevant both because valuable for the employer and because they facilitate job mobility. Our estimates of the elasticity of executives? salaries with respect to the size of their professional networks vary between around 5% and around 20% depending on the specification, with a point estimate under our preferred specification of 6.7%.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Labor mobility; Social capital; Social Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 J31 J62 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Professional Network and Career Coevolution (2011)
Working Paper: Professional Network and Career Coevolution (2011)
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