Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience
Juan Dolado,
Samuel Bentolila and
Juan F Jimeno
No 8691, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Abstract:
This paper presents a case study on reforming a very dysfunctional labour market with a deep insider-outsider divide, namely the Spanish case. We show how a dual market, with permanent and temporary employees makes real reform much harder, and leads to purely marginal changes that do not alter the fundamental features of labour market institutions. While the Great Recession and the start of the sovereign debt crisis triggered two labour reforms, the political economy equilibrium has not allowed them to be transformational enough.
Keywords: Temporary contracts; Dualism; Labour market reform; Political economy; Great recession (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H29 J23 J38 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Reforming an insider-outsider labor market: the Spanish experience (2012) 
Working Paper: Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience (2012) 
Working Paper: Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience (2011) 
Working Paper: Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience (2011) 
Working Paper: Reforming an Insider-Outsider Labor Market: The Spanish Experience (2011) 
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