Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector

Johannes Van Biesebroeck and Hang Gao

No 8695, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study whether the 2002 deregulation and vertical unbundling of the Chinese electricity sector has boosted productivity in the generation segment of the industry. Controlling explicitly for sources of price-heterogeneity across firms and for firm-fixed effects, we find deregulation to be associated with a reduction in labor input and material use of 6 and 4 percent, respectively. This effect only appears two years after the reforms, is robust to alternative ways of identifying restructured firms, and to the nonrandom selection of restructured firms using a matching estimator. Input use of new state-owned firms that start operations two years into the reform period does not differ significantly anymore from input use of private sector entrants.

Keywords: Productivity; Regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L5 L9 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-ene, nep-hme, nep-reg and nep-tra
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Effects of Deregulation and Vertical Unbundling on the Performance of China's Electricity Generation Sector (2014)
Working Paper: Effects of deregulation and vertical unbundling on the performance of China's electricity generation sector (2011)
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