Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation

Kfir Eliaz and Geoffroy de Clippel

No 8733, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the group reach a decision by voting whether each premise is true or false, or should they simply vote on the outcome? We show that for any finite number of individuals, the premise-based voting rule is more efficient in aggregating information than the outcome-based rule. However, generically, the gain from using the premise-based over the outcome-based rule can only be marginal when numerous individuals express independent opinions. Indeed, the outcome-based game is almost always asymptotically efficient.

Keywords: Common interest; Discursive dilemma; Doctrinal paradox; Information aggregation; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8733 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation (2015)
Working Paper: Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8733

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP8733

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().