Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT

Bernard Hoekman and Petros C Mavroidis

No 876, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper argues that further moves to liberalize trade and to implement existing GATT disciplines may have a greater impact on global competition than the pursuit of harmonized multilateral competition policy disciplines. It also suggests that current GATT rules and case law provide scope for both the application and non-application of existing domestic competition laws of contracting parties to be challenged in those instances where this leads to de facto discrimination between domestic and foreign products. Little use has been made of the GATT in this connection, suggesting that exploration of existing indirect avenues to raise competition-related disputes in GATT be pursued more actively. This would help to identify what specific government policies might be the subject of multilateral negotiations and explicit incorporation into the GATT framework.

Keywords: Competition Policy; GATT; Multilateral Trade Negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT (1994)
Working Paper: Competition, competition policy, and the GATT (1993)
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