Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?

Yves Zenou, ,, Eleonora Patacchini and Xiaodong Liu
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Lung-Fei Lee

No 8772, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We analyze delinquent networks of adolescents in the United States. We develop a dynamic network formation model showing who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest possible reduction in aggregate crime level. We then structurally estimate our model using data on criminal behaviors of adolescents in the United States (AddHealth data). Compared to other criminals, key players are more likely to be a male, have less educated parents, are less attached to religion and feel socially more excluded. We also find that, even though some criminals are not very active in criminal activities, they can be key players because they have a crucial position in the network in terms of betweenness centrality.

Keywords: Bonacich centrality; Crime policies; Dynamic network formation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D85 K42 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (69)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2012)
Working Paper: Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2012)
Working Paper: Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2011)
Working Paper: Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player? (2011)
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