Incentives and Stability Of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment

Carlo Carraro (), Valentina Bosetti, Emanuele Massetti, Massimo Tavoni () and Enrica De Cian ()

No 8821, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions? profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and 'potential stability' of a number of coalitions which are 'potentially effective' in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 'potentially stable' even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.

Keywords: Climate coalitions; Climate policy; Free riding; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C68 C72 D58 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Incentives and stability of international climate coalitions: An integrated assessment (2013)
Working Paper: Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment (2011)
Working Paper: Incentives and Stability of International Climate Coalitions: An Integrated Assessment (2011)
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