Labour Market Structure, Conservative Bankers and the Feasibility of Monetary Union

Paul Levine () and Joseph Pearlman

No 903, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper examines the conduct of monetary policy in an economy with overlapping multi-period nominal wage contracts. We examine the welfare implications of stabilization policy in the face of random supply shocks. In the absence of precommitment, the discretionary policy can be improved by choosing bankers who are more conservative than the `median voter' in that they attach a higher priority to achieving low inflation than higher output. The choice of an optimal banker depends on the degree of nominal and real wage rigidities and the presence of the latter can improve the feasibility of a monetary union.

Keywords: Conservative Bankers; European Central Bank; Labour Market Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E58 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=903 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:903

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=903

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().