De Jure and de Facto Determinants of Power: Evidence from Mississippi

Graziella Bertocchi () and Arcangelo Dimico

No 9064, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We evaluate the empirical relevance of de facto vs. de jure determinants of political power in the U.S. South between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. We apply a variety of estimation techniques to a previously unexploited dataset on voter registration by race covering the counties of Mississippi in 1896, shortly after the introduction of the 1890 voting restrictions encoded in the state constitution. Our results indicate that de jure voting restrictions reduce black registration but that black disfranchisement starts well before 1890 and is more intense where a black majority represents a threat to the de facto power of white elites. Moreover, the effect of race becomes stronger after 1890 suggesting that the de jure barriers may have served the purpose of institutionalizing a de facto condition of disfranchisement.

Keywords: Race; Voting; Education; Institutions; Inequality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J15 N41 O43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dem and nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9064 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: De jure and de facto determinants of power: evidence from Mississippi (2017)
Working Paper: De Jure and De Facto Determinants of Power: Evidence from Mississippi (2012)
Working Paper: De Jure and de Facto Determinants of Power: Evidence from Mississippi (2012)
Working Paper: De Jure and de Facto Determinants of Power:Evidence from Mississippi (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9064

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP9064

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().