The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe

Guido Tabellini and Avner Greif

No 9072, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Over the last millennium, the clan and the city have been the locus of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines - analytically, historically, and empirically - the cultural, social, and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such groups impact institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Moral groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation.

Keywords: China; Europe; Institutions; Public goods; Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: N00 O10 O50 P51 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc and nep-tra
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: The Clan and the City: Sustaining Cooperation in China and Europe (2012)
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