The neighbor is king: Customer discrimination in the housing market

Pierre-Philippe Combes, Alain Trannoy, Bruno Decreuse and Benoit Schmutz

No 9160, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper provides a method to single out customer-based discrimination in the housing market. We build a matching model with ethnic externalities where landlords differ in the number of housing units they own within the same building. Multiple-dwelling landlords discriminate more often than single-dwelling landlords only if some tenants are prejudiced against the minority group. By testing the null hypothesis whereby minority tenants are equally likely to have a multiple-dwelling landlord, we can test whether there is customer discrimination or not. We run the test on French data and show evidence of customer discrimination in the rental market.

Keywords: Customer discrimination; Housing market; Matching frictions; Neighborhood externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J71 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Neighbor is King: Customer Discrimination in the Housing Market (2012)
Working Paper: The Neighbor is King: Customer Discrimination in the Housing Market (2012)
Working Paper: The neighbor is king: Customer discrimination in the housing market (2011)
Working Paper: The Neighbor is King: Customer Discrimination in the Housing Market (2010)
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