Central Bank Constitutions for Monetary Unions

Ralph Süppel and Juergen von Hagen

No 919, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Historical experience suggests that the distribution of monetary policy authority among the members of a monetary union is a key aspect of the design of a central bank constitution. We analyse alternative institutional solutions to that problem with different degrees of centralization of monetary policy decisions. The degree of centralization required to facilitate credible, low-inflation policies depends critically on the political structure of the monetary union. Efficient monetary stabilization requires centralized decision-making rules. Whether or not stabilization can be improved by adding central appointees to member state representatives on the central bank council depends on the stochastic structure of the relevant economic disturbances.

Keywords: Central Banks; Monetary Policy; Monetary Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E52 E58 F36 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=919 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:919

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... pers/dp.php?dpno=919

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().