Trust, Values and False Consensus

Luigi Guiso, Paola Giuliano and Jeffrey Butler

No 9216, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners - i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Miscalibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

Keywords: Trust; Trustworthiness; Culture; False consensus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A1 A12 D1 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: TRUST, VALUES, AND FALSE CONSENSUS (2015)
Working Paper: Trust, Values and False Consensus (2012)
Working Paper: Trust, Values and False Consensus (2012)
Working Paper: Trust, Values and False Consensus (2012)
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