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Towards a Legal Theory of Finance

Katharina Pistor

No 9235, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper develops the building blocks for a legal theory of finance. LTF holds that financial markets are legally constructed and as such occupy an essentially hybrid place between state and market, public and private. At the same time, financial markets exhibit dynamics that frequently put them in direct tension with commitments enshrined in law or contracts. This is the case especially in times of financial crises when the full enforcement of legal commitments would result in the self-destruction of the financial system. This law-finance paradox tends to be resolved by suspending the full force of law where the survival of the system is at stake; that is, at its core. Here, power becomes salient. This helps explain why finance is concentrated around ultimate lenders of last resort and why regulating finance?s core has become so elusive. It also holds lessons for future reforms.

Keywords: Finance; Financial crisis; Financial regulation; Law; Political economy; Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F5 G01 G2 K0 K22 N20 P1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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