EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Trade liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from Chinese Exporters

Amit Khandelwal, Peter Schott () and Shang-Jin Wei

No 9246, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: If trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions, trade liberalization can lead to greater-than-expected gains. We examine Chinese textile and clothing exports before and after the removal of externally imposed quotas. Both the surge in export volumes and the decline in prices after the quota removal are driven by net entry, implying that the pre-liberalization quota allocation is not based on firm productivity. Removing this misallocation accounts for a substantial share of the overall productivity gains associated with the quota removal.

Keywords: China; misallocation; Multifibre Agreement; productivity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F1 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eff, nep-int and nep-tra
Date: 2012-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=9246 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Journal Article: Trade Liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from Chinese Exporters (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Trade Liberalization and Embedded Institutional Reform: Evidence from Chinese Exporters (2011) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9246

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=9246

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-01-16
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9246