Cooperative Investment, Uncertainty and Access

Steffen Hoernig and Carlo Cambini
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Marc Bourreau

No 9376, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We investigate cooperative investment for the deployment of a new infrastructure, and how it interacts with access obligations and demand uncertainty. Co-investment increases total coverage only if service differentiation and/or cost savings from joint investment, in particular due to high uncertainty, are high. Mandated access reduces incentives for co-investment not only through lower returns but also by the existence of the access option itself. Voluntary access provision increases infrastructure coverage but reduces social welfare by softening competition.

Keywords: Access obligations; Co-investment; Networks; Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D43 G31 L5 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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