Emotions and Political Unrest

Guido Tabellini and Francesco Passarelli

No 9446, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper formulates a theory of how political unrest influences public policy. Political unrest is motivated by emotions. Individuals engage in protests if they are aggrieved and feel that they have been treated unfairly. This reaction is predictable because individuals have a consistent view of what is fair. This framework yields novel insights about the sources of political influence of different groups in society. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups have access to the same technology for political participation, equilibrium policy can be distorted. Individuals form their view of what is fair taking into account the current state of the world. If fewer aggregate resources are available, individuals accept a lower level of welfare. This resignation effect in turn induces a benevolent government to procrastinate unpleasant policy choices.

Keywords: Emotions; Fairness; Political economics; Procrastrination; Public debt; Riots; Unrest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Working Paper: Emotions and Political Unrest (2013)
Working Paper: Emotions and Political Unrest (2013)
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