CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis

Xavier Gabaix, Augustin Landier and Julien Sauvagnat

No 9498, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In the "size of stakes" view quantitatively formalized in Gabaix and Landier (2008), CEO compensation is determined in a competitive talent market, and re flects the size of firms affected by talent. This paper offers empirical update on this view. The years 2004-2011, which include the recent crisis, were not part of the initial study and o er a laboratory to examine the theory as they include new positive and negative shocks to the size of large firms. Executive compensation at the top (ex ante) did closely track the evolution of average rm value during those years. During the crisis (2007 - 2009), average total firm value decreased by 17%, and CEO pay decreased by 28%. During 2009-2011, we observe a rebound of firm value by 19% and of CEO pay increased by 22%. These fairly proportional changes provide a validity check in favor of the "size of stakes" view.

Keywords: Assignment models; Economics of superstars; Executive pay; Inequality; Matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 J24 J3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-hme, nep-hrm and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: CEO Pay and Firm Size: An Update After the Crisis (2014)
Working Paper: CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis (2013)
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