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Legal Evolution, Contract Evolution, and Standardization

Nicola Gennaioli (), Enrico Perotti () and Giacomo Ponzetto ()

No 9836, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In a model where biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we uncover positive feedback effects between the use of innovative contracts and legal evolution that improve verifiability and contracting over time. We find, however, that the cost of judicial bias also grows over time because the unpredictable application of precedents becomes costlier as the law matures. Contract standardization avoids this cost, statically improving enforcement; but it crowds out innovative contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shed light on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth century in many common-law countries during a period of booming long-distance trade.

Keywords: contracts; imperfect enforcement; legal evolution; precedents; standardization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D86 K12 K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Date: 2014-02
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