When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector

Thierry Verdier, Gani Aldashev and Esteban Jaimovich

No 9963, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model of an economy with the non-profit sector financed through private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher income in the for-profit sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non-profit sector. If motivated donors give more than unmotivated ones, there exist two stable (motivational) equilibria. Linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-profit sector or a tax-financed public funding of non-profits can eliminate the bad equilibrium.

Keywords: altruism; Charitable giving; Foreign aid.; Non-profit organizations; Occupational choice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D5 D64 J24 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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