Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2014-03, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely on classical axioms such as symmetry, efficiency or linearity. Moreover, our approach reveals a new instructive role played by veto players.

Keywords: Veto players; Addition invariance; Basis; Kernel; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization (2014)
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