Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: In this article, we provide a new basis for the kernel of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), which is used to construct a new axiom of invariance, and to provide a new axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value. This characterization only invokes marginalistic principles, and does not rely on classical axioms such as symmetry, efficiency or linearity. Moreover, our approach reveals a new instructive role played by veto players.

Keywords: Veto players; Addition invariance; Basis; Kernel; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-10-01
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01377927v1
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Working Paper: Veto players, the kernel of the Shapley value and its characterization (2014)
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