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Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

Sylvain Béal (), Sylvain Ferrières (), Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2015-06, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: Many axiomatic characterizations of values for cooperative games invoke axioms which evaluate the consequences of removing an arbitrary player. Balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010) are two well-known examples of such axioms. We revisit these characterizations by nullifying a player instead of deleting her/him from a game. The nullification (Béal et al., 2014) of a player is obtained by transforming a game into a new one in which this player is a null player, i.e. the worth of the coalitions containing this player is now identical to that of the same coalition without this player. The degree with which our results are close to the original results in the literature is connected to the fact that the targeted value satisfies the null player out axiom (Derks and Haller, 1999).

Keywords: Player nullification; balanced contributions; Shapley value; equal allocation of non-separable costs; potential. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (2016)
Working Paper: Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification (2016) Downloads
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