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Axiomatic characterizations under players nullification

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières (), Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: Many axiomatic characterizations of values for cooperative games invoke axioms which evaluate the consequences of removing an arbitrary player. Balanced contributions (Myerson, 1980) and balanced cycle contributions (Kamijo and Kongo, 2010) are two well-known examples of such axioms. We revisit these characterizations by nullifying a player instead of deleting her/him from a game. The nullification (Beal et al., 2014a) of a player is obtained by transforming a game into a new one in which this player is a null player, i.e. the worth of the coalitions containing this player is now identical to that of the same coalition without this player. The degree with which our results are close to the original results in the literature is connected to the fact that the targeted value satisfies the null player out axiom (Derks and Haller, 1999). We also revisit the potential approach (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989) similarly.

Keywords: Shapley value; Potential; Nullified player; Cooperative games; Axiomatic characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2016, 80, pp.47-57. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.01.002⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01293700

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.01.002

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