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A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2015-07, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al., 2014). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rood tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them

Keywords: Bidding approach; Implementation; Rooted tree TU-games; Sequential equal surplus division (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2017)
Working Paper: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2015) Downloads
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