A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

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Abstract: We provide a strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule (Béal et al. in Theory Decis 79:251–283, 2015). Precisely, we design a non-cooperative mechanism of which the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs correspond to the sequential equal surplus division outcome of a superadditive rooted tree TU-game. This mechanism borrowed from the bidding mechanism designed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001), but takes into account the direction of the edges connecting any two players in the rooted tree, which reflects some dominance relation between them. Our proofs rely on interesting properties that we provide for a general class of bidding mechanisms.

Keywords: Bidding approach; ‘Take-it-or-leave-it’ procedure; Implementation; Rooted tree; TU-games; Sequential equal surplus division (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Annals of Operations Research, 2017, 253 (1), pp. 43-59. ⟨10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5⟩

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Journal Article: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2017)
Working Paper: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2015)
Working Paper: A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01381379

DOI: 10.1007/s10479-016-2290-5

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