Coalitional desirability and the equal division value

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

No 2017-08, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We introduce three natural collective variants of the well-known axiom of Desirability (Maschler and Peleg, 1966), which require that if the (per capita) contributions of a first coalition are at least as large as the (per capita) contributions of a second coalition, then the (average) payoff in the first coalition should be as large as the (average) payoff in the second coalition. These axioms are called Coalitional desirability and Average coalitional desirability. The third variant, called Uniform coalitional desirability applies only to coalitions with the same size. We show that Coalitional desirability is very strong: no value satisfies simultaneously this axiom and Efficiency. To the contrary, the combination of either Average coalitional desirability or Uniform coalitional desirability with Efficiency and Additivity characterizes the Equal Division value.

Keywords: Desirability; Coalitional desirability; Average coalitional desirability; Uniform coalitional desirability; Equal Division value; Shapley value. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2017-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Published in Theory and Decision, February 2019, Volume 86, Issue 1, pp 95–106

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Related works:
Journal Article: Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (2019)
Working Paper: Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crb:wpaper:2017-08

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9672-x

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