Coalitional desirability and the equal division value

Sylvain Béal, Éric Rémila () and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Éric Rémila: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We introduce three natural collective variants of the well-known axiom of desirability (Maschler and Peleg in Pac J Math 18:289-328, 1966), which require that if the (per capita) contributions of a first coalition are at least as large as the (per capita) contributions of a second coalition, then the (average) payoff in the first coalition should be as large as the (average) payoff in the second coalition. These axioms are called coalitional desirability and average coalitional desirability. The third variant, called uniform coalitional desirability, applies only to coalitions with the same size. We show that coalitional desirability is very strong: no value satisfies simultaneously this axiom and efficiency. To the contrary, the combination of either average coalitional desirability or uniform coalitional desirability with efficiency and additivity characterizes the equal division value.

Keywords: Desirability; Coalitional desirability; Average coalitional desirability; Uniform coalitional desirability; Equal division value; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Theory and Decision, 2019, 86 (1), pp.95-106. ⟨10.1007/s11238-018-9672-x⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (2019)
Working Paper: Coalitional desirability and the equal division value (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01951010

DOI: 10.1007/s11238-018-9672-x

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().