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Axiomatic and bargaining foundations of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

Sylvain Béal (), Sylvain Ferrières (), Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal
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Sylvain Ferrières: Université de Bourgogne Franche-Comté, CRESE

No 2017-11, Working Papers from CRESE

Abstract: We introduce the class of tree TU-games augmented by a total order over the links which re ects the formation process of the tree. We rst characterize a new allocation rule for this class of cooperative games by means of three axioms, Standardness, Top-consistency and Link Amalgamation. Then, we provide a bargaining foundation for this allocation rule by designing a mechanism, including a bidding stage followed by a bargaining stage, which supports this allocation rule in subgame Nash equilibrium provided that the underlying game is superadditive.

Keywords: Amalgamation; Bargaining; Consistency; Tree TU-games; Total order (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2017-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (2017)
Working Paper: Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (2017)
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