Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games

Philippe Solal, Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières () and Eric Rémila
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Sylvain Ferrières: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Date: 2017-07-17
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Published in Workshop Networks : Dynamics, Information, Centrality, and Games", Jul 2017, Paris, France

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Related works:
Working Paper: Axiomatic and bargaining foundations of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (2017)
Working Paper: Axiomatic and bargaining foundation of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01644811

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