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Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism

Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm (), Lise Vesterlund and Huan Xie
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Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm: Indiana University Purdue University-Indianapolis

No 14002, Working Papers from Concordia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: The extant experimental design to investigate warm glow and altruism elicits a single measure of crowd-out. Not recognizing that impure altruism predicts crowd-out is a function of giving-by-others, this design's power to reject pure altruism varies with the level of giving-by-others, and it cannot identify the strength of warm glow and altruism preferences. These limitations are addressed with a new design that elicits crowd-out at a low and at a high level of giving-by-others. Consistent with impure altruism we find decreasing crowd-out as giving-by-others increases. However warm glow is weak in our experiment and altruism largely explains why people give.

Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: Why Do People Give? Testing Pure and Impure Altruism (2014) Downloads
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