Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument for Targeting Transfers

Robin Boadway and Katherine Cuff

No 71, Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers from CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal

Abstract: Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these theree cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor whether unemployed individuals are searching for work and accepting any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary, and consider how a minimum wage might be a useful adjunct to monitoring contingent tax-transfer policies.

Les programmes de redistribution sont contraints par le fait que les sans-emploi peuvent être des individus inaptes au travail, volontairement au chômage ou involontairement au chômage. L'incapacité de distinguer parmi ces trois possibilités réduit la qualité du ciblage des transferts destinés à ceux qui en ont le plus besoin. Permettre au gouvernement de vérifier que les individus au chômage cherchent un emploi et qu'ils acceptent les offres qu'ils reçoivent accroît sa capacité à redistribuer le revenu. Nous montrons que ces activités de vérification sont complémentaires et établissons les circonstances sous lesquelles un salaire minimum peut être un ajout utile à un système dans lequel les taxes-transferts dépendent des résultats de la vérification.

Keywords: redistribution; monitoring; unemployement; targeting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 I38 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 1999-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ltv, nep-pol and nep-pub
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument For Targeting Transfers (1999)
Working Paper: Monitoring Job Search As An Instrument For Targeting Transfers (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cre:crefwp:71

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