Monitoring Job Search As An Instrument For Targeting Transfers

Robin Boadway and Katherine Cuff

No 982, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Redistribution programs are constrained because those not working may be either unable to work, voluntarily unemployed or involuntarily unemployed. The inability to distinguish among these three cases inhibits the targeting of transfers to those most in need. Enabling the government to monitor whether unemployed individuals are searching for work and accepting any offered jobs increases its ability to redistribute income. We show that these monitoring activities are complementary, and consider how a minimum wage might be a useful adjunct to monitoring contingent tax-transfer policies.

Keywords: Targeting; Redistribution; Monitoring; Unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H21 I38 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1999-02
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_982.pdf First version 1999 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument For Targeting Transfers (1999)
Working Paper: Monitoring Job Search as an Instrument for Targeting Transfers (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:982

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