A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics
Gil Epstein and
Ira Gang
No 1015, RF Berlin - CReAM Discussion Paper Series from Rockwool Foundation Berlin (RF Berlin) - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM)
Abstract:
Within immigrant society different groups wish to help the migrants in different ways - immigrant societies are multi-layered and multi-dimensional. We examine the situation where there exists a foundation that has resources and that wishes to help the migrants. To do so they need migrant groups to invest effort in helping their country-folk. Migrant groups compete against one another by helping their country-folk and to win grants from the foundation. We develop a model that considers how such a competition affects the resources invested by the groups' supporters and how beneficial it is to immigrants. We consider two alternative rewards systems for supporters - absolute and relative ranking - in achieving their goals.
Date: 2010-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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https://www.cream-migration.org/publ_uploads/CDP_15_10.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics (2010) 
Working Paper: A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics (2010) 
Working Paper: A Political Economy of the Immigrant Assimilation: Internal Dynamics (2010) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crm:wpaper:1015
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