Migration for Marriage

Shadi Farahzadi

No 26027, RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series from ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin)

Abstract: The impact of policies restricting marriage migration depends on whether it is driven by preferences to marry within one's group (endogamy preferences) or gains from residency in a developed country (outside market value). I develop a novel marriage matching model incorporating the choice to marry from one's origin country. I focus on British Muslims, since half of them marry someone from their origin country. I find that 80% of Muslim marriage migration is explained by endogamy preferences. Therefore, raising the costs of marriage migration does not increase their integration through intermarriage; instead, it leads to a larger share of unmarried Muslims.

Keywords: Migration; Integration; Marriage Market; Matching Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J12 J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-01
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