Equity and Efficiency in Anti-Discrimination Policy: Evidence from an Anonymous Hiring Pilot

Ohto Kanninen, Sanni Kiviholma and Tuomo Virkola

No 26285, RFBerlin Discussion Paper Series from ROCKWOOL Foundation Berlin (RFBerlin)

Abstract: Anonymous hiring restricts the information available to hiring managers, potentially creating a trade-off between equity and hiring efficiency. We leverage a pilot program by the City of Helsinki in which hiring for some, but not all, job titles was subject to anonymization. We find that applicants with immigrant background were more likely to be hired without detrimental effects on job turnover or wages. Announcing anonymization increased job applications, but not by groups that ex-post had the most to gain. Our results suggest anonymization can be an effective anti-discrimination policy at least when it's mandated and not voluntary for hiring managers.

Keywords: anonymous hiring; discrimination; information frictions; job search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J15 J24 J68 J71 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-10
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