The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders

Laurent Lamy

No 2007-24, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities arenot observed by the econometrician. First, we adapt the definition ofidentifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and we explore theextent to which anonymity reduces the possibility to identify privatevalue auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent privatevalue model which is nonparametrically identified, we adapt Guerre,Perrigne and Vuong [10]'s two-stage estimation procedure. Our multistagekernel-based estimator achieves the optimal uniform convergencerate when identities are observed.

Pages: 34
Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://crest.science/RePEc/wpstorage/2007-24.pdf Crest working paper version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (2012)
Working Paper: The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (2012)
Working Paper: The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (2012)
Working Paper: The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (2008)
Working Paper: The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crs:wpaper:2007-24

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Murielle Jules Maintainer-Email : murielle.jules@ensae.Fr.