 The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous biddersPSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL Abstract: We consider standard auction models when bidders' identities are not-or are only partially-observed by the econometrician. We first adapt the definition of identifiability to a framework with anonymous bids and explore the extent to which anonymity reduces the possibility of identifying private value auction models. Second, in the asymmetric independent private value model which is nonparametrically identified, we generalize Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong's estimation procedure [Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions, Econometrica 68 (2000) 525-574] and consider the asymptotic properties of our multi-step kernel-based estimator. Monte Carlo simulations illustrate the practical relevance of our estimation procedure in small data sets. Keywords: Auctions; Nonparametric identification; Nonparametric estimation; Unobserved heterogeneity; Anonymous bids; Uniform convergence rate (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Econometrics, 2012, 167 (1), pp.113-132. ⟨10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.10.007⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-00754606 DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.10.007 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL |
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