"Innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards
Paolo Garella ()
No 606, Working Papers from University of Crete, Department of Economics
The present note shows that "innocuous" Minimum Quality Standards, namely below the lowest quality in a market, may have effects on equilibrium outcomes. Such a MQS reduces the incentive to invest in R&D by the quality-leading firm.
Keywords: Regulation; Minimum Quality Standards; Oligopoly; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L0 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino and nep-mic
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http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/revnotefin3.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: "Innocuous" minimum quality standards (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:crt:wpaper:0606
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