Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games

Abigail Barr, Chris Wallace, Jean Ensminger, Joseph Henrich, Clark Barrette, Alexander Bolyanatz, Juan-Camilo Cardenas, Michael Gurven, Edwins Gwako, Carolyn Lesorogol, Frank Marlowe, Richard McElreath, David Tracer and John Ziker

No 2009-02, CSAE Working Paper Series from Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford

Abstract: Data from three bargaining games-the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game-played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergences between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling.

Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Homo Aqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (2009)
Working Paper: Homo Aequalis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (2009)
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