Homo Aequalis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games

Abigail Barr, Chris WallaceJean Ensminger and Joseph Henrich
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Chris Wallace and Juan-Camilo Cardenas

No 422, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: Data from three bargaining games - the Dictator Game, the Ultimatum Game, and the Third-Party Punishment Game - played in 15 societies are presented. The societies range from US undergraduates to Amazonian, Arctic, and African hunter-gatherers. Behaviour within the games varies markedly across societies. The paper investigates whether this behavioural diversity can be explained solely by variations in inequality aversion. Combining a single parameter utility function with the notion of subgame perfection generates a number of testable predictions. While most of these are supported, there are some telling divergencies between theory and data: uncertainty and preferences relating to acts of vengeance may have influenced play in the Ultimatum and Third-Party Punishment Games; and a few subjects used the games as an opportunity to engage in costly signalling

Keywords: Bargaining Games; Cross-cultural Experiments; Inequality Aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C9 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Homo Aqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (2009)
Working Paper: Homo Æqualis: A Cross-Society Experimental Analysis of Three Bargaining Games (2009)
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